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Abstract Names, as proper nouns, are clearly important for
the identification of individuals in everyday life. In the present
article, I argue that forenames and surnames need also to be
recognized as Bdoing^ words, important in the categorization
of sex at birth and in the ongoing management of gender
conduct appropriate to sex category. Using evidence on per-
sonal naming practices in the United States and United
Kingdom, I examine what happens at crisis points of sexed
and gendered naming in the life course (for example, at the
birth of babies, at marriage, and during gender-identity transi-
tions). I show how forenames and surnames help in the em-
bodied doing of gender and, likewise, that bodies are key to
gendered practices of forenaming and surnaming: we have
Bgendered embodied named identities.^ Whether normative
and compliant, pragmatic, or creative and resistant,
forenaming and surnaming practices are revealed as core to
the production and reproduction of binary sex categories and
to gendered identities, difference, hierarchies, and
inequalities.
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Inequalities
Governed as they are by common law and national or local
statutes, practices of personal naming in the United Kingdom
and United States are relatively unfettered by legislation (for
the U.S., see MacDougall 1985; for the UK, see Finch 2008).
Nonetheless, practices of personal naming in these countries
are patterned and structured: first, as a consequence of repli-
cation of usage of the names of individuals and recurring
demands for the authentication of individual identity over
time; second, by cultural traditions and conventions (including
those patrilineal and patriarchal in origin) whereby personal
names are used to mark individual and social identities (Finch
2008). Despite their fundamental and ubiquitous importance
for each individual in a multitude of contexts, scholars are
only just beginning to give personal names and naming prac-
tices Bthe theoretical and analytical scrutiny^ they deserve
(Palsson 2014, p. 618).
In particular, sex and gendered forenaming and surnaming
practices suffer from a form of what psychologists call func-
tional fixedness, whereby the well-known function of an ob-
ject masks its other possible uses (Corsini 1999). In the case of
personal names, their everyday familiarity makes it hard to
move beyond a taken-for-granted understanding of their use
and meaning within the gendered social world. My aim in the
present article is to break down this functional fixedness about
personal names and gender and thereby achieve a step-change
in the theoretical and analytical scrutiny of their relationship.
The sociologist Norbert Elias (1991) argued that forenames
help denote individuality (or BI^ identities), whereas surnames
are important in signaling BWe^ identities (i.e., BWe are
family^). For sure, forenames-plus-surnames operate in these
kinds of ways simultaneously to display both individuality
and connectedness. In so doing, though, it is my argument in
the present article that forenames and surnames are also con-
structing and displaying sex and gender. The display of indi-
viduality and connectedness through personal names is a
gendered process and is especially apparent when newborns
are given forenames, when transgender people choose fore-
names for themselves, when heterosexual women marry, and
when children are given surnames. In an innovative approach,
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I critically re-evaluate evidence in relation to these personal
naming practices and anchor it in an original theoretical con-
figuration in which I deploy my own concept of Bgendered
embodied named identity^ (see also Pilcher 2016, p. 774), as
well as draw on the Bdoing gender^ perspective (Kessler and
McKenna 1978; West and Zimmerman 1987) and the frame-
work of Bhabits, crises and creativity^ offered by Shilling
(2008, p. 1). Using this approach, in the final section of my
article I identify the multifaceted uses of personal names and
their socially consequentiality in the context of the power
structures of sex, gender, and race/ethnicity in societies such
as the United Kingdom and United States.
Names and (Re)Doing Gender
Sociological understandings of gender as doing derive both
from Goffman’s symbolic interactionist analysis of gender
display (for example, Goffman 1959) and Garfinkel’s (1967)
ethnomethodology of gender, with subsequent elaborations by
Kessler and McKenna (1978) and West and Zimmerman
(1987). In summary, in the doing gender approach, both sex
and gender are theorized as socially constructed categoriza-
tions, identifications, and practices—routinely accomplished
in everyday, ongoing social interactions and within which
bodies are central. More recently, this approach has piqued
sociological interest in the Bre-doing^ of gender, where the
embodied identifications and practices of individuals deviate
from normative sex categorizations and gender displays (for
example, see Connell 2010). Together, these features make the
doing gender approach useful for my purposes in the present
article. Also useful for my purposes is the work of Shilling
(2008). In his discussion of processes and changes that arise
from the Bhabits, crises and creativity^ (p. 1) swirling in and
out of people’s lives over time and affecting their bodies and
identities, Shilling bestows a framework I can use to explore
naming practices at critical points across the life course of
individuals and families, including at birth and at marriage.
My summary of Shilling’s work and the doing gender per-
spective shows that embodiment and identities are recognized
by scholars to be inextricably intertwined (Howson 2004;
Jenkins 2008; Lawler 2008; Shilling 2008, 2012). However,
as I have argued elsewhere (Pilcher 2016), our identities inex-
tricably involve not only our bodies but also our names.
Consequently, the concept of embodied named identity is nec-
essary to capture the outcomes of identification practices of
naming that are fundamentally orientated around and rooted in
the body. In the present article, my focus is more specifically
on the nexus of names, sexed and gendered bodies, and iden-
tities. In other words, my focus is on gendered embodied
named identities. I show how sexed and gendered bodies are
irreducibly intertwined with the identity practices of personal
naming: Bodies are key to gendered practices of forenaming
and surnaming, and forenames and surnames likewise help in
the embodied doing of gender.
In the remainder of my article, I re-evaluate a range of
evidence on sex, gender, and naming practices in relation to
three key questions. First, how do embodied individuals re-
spond to routinized naming traditions in relation to sex and
gender at critical/crisis points of naming in the life course (for
example, newborn babies, marriage, divorce, gender-identity
transitions)? Second, how do individuals experience and man-
age crises brought about by the breaching of normative expec-
tations about the coincidence of names with sexed/gendered
bodies? Third, in what ways are naming practices and their
outcomes socially uneven and unequal (Duncan 2011)?
Children’s Forenaming
Contemporary reproductive technologies allow the sexing of a
fetus (categorizing its sex) to occur prior to birth. Whether
before or after its birth, a child’s sex is decided through the
application of socially agreed biological criteria (typically
using the appearance of genitalia) for classifying bodies as
female or male. Once the child has been sexed using the body,
parents must, shortly thereafter, make a choice about the fore-
name their child will have. Determinants of forename choices
made for children include kin and ethnic affiliations and hon-
oring (discussed further in the following), as well as changing
cultural influences (Alford 1988; Daly and Wilson 1982;
Edwards and Caballero 2008; Fryer and Levitt 2003;
Lieberson 2000; Sue and Telles 2007). Yet, it is the sex cate-
gorization of the child as female or male which remains the
primary determinant of forename choices.
It is a very strong cultural norm in the United Kingdom and
United States (as elsewhere) to give a new-born baby a sex-
specific forename (Alford 1988), according to the sex catego-
rization of its body as male or female. Androgynous, or sex/
gender-neutral forenames, are rarely used. In an analysis of
U.S. data by Lieberson et al. (2000), 97% of forenames
regarded as female-appropriate are only given to children
whose sex category is female. Likewise, 97% of forenames
viewed as male-appropriate are only given to children whose
sex category is male (see also Herbert and Aylene 2014). As
Lieberson and colleagues’ analysis shows, there was no sig-
nificant increase in the use of androgynous forenames in the
twentieth century despite the important changes in gender
relations that occurred during that period. Indeed, books and
websites of today advising parents-to-be on baby names still
tend to list possibilities only by the sex categories of boys and
girls (for example, www.babynames.com; Joynes 2013).
Moreover, in its annual report on the most popular baby
forenames, the UK’s Office of National Statistics (2015) list
forenames only by two sex categories (boys and girls).
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At the very beginning of the incorporation of a newborn
into social personhood, then, forenames are used in the deci-
sive accomplishment of the categorization of sex (e.g., This
baby has a vagina, therefore it is female. So, she will have a
girl’s name.) and in the management of gender conduct appro-
priate to sex category (e.g., You can know this baby is female
even when her genitals are hidden because the forename given
to her clearly displays her sex category). As argued by
Messerschmidt (2009), sex-categorized bodies are necessarily
involved in the doing of gender, including in relation to my
own example of forenaming practices. Once the initial sex-
specific forenaming has been made, the given boy’s or girl’s
forename acts (in most cases) repeatedly to categorize the
individual as being a female or male throughout their subse-
quent life course.
As my illustrative examples of forenaming show, gendered
embodied named identity is a core part of what Shilling (2008,
p. 15) calls the Bbody pedagogy^ of an individual’s appear-
ance, activities, skills, and capacities which bolster claims to
their membership in a sex category and cumulatively and con-
stantly accomplish their gender. Because there are strong nor-
mative expectations about the coincidence of body pedagogy
and forenames (Alford 1988; Lieberson et al. 2000), any
breaches may affect claims to membership in a sex category
and disrupt the performance and accomplishment of gender.
Useful here is Connell’s (2009, p. 107) concept of
Bcontradictory embodiment,^ which describes aspects of em-
bodiment that are perceived to be abnormal or irregular (also
see Messerschmidt 2009).
In relation to personal names, I argue that contradictory
embodiment occurs when normative expectations about the
coincidence of bodies, sex category, gender, and forenames
are breached. If individuals are perceived to have (whether by
themselves or by others) a gender-wrong forename, a person’s
femininity or masculinity may be disrupted as a consequence.
The song BABoyNamed Sue^ (popularized by country singer
Johnny Cash) details the gender trouble that stems from the
contradictory embodiment of a boy having a female-
appropriate forename (Absolute Lyrics 2017). This fictional
portrayal of the consequences of contradictory embodiment in
relation to forenames is supported by Figlio’s (2007) research.
In this U.S.-based study of behavior problems and students’
test scores, it was found that, in middle school, a large gap
emerged in behavior between boys with female-typed names
and other boys; specifically, the former were more disruptive
in school than the latter were.
To explain why boys with gender-inappropriate forenames
may experience problems and their gender practices held to
account, I can apply Thorne’s (1993) concept of gender
contamination. In a classic study of gender play, Thorne
claims that girls who are tomboys gain benefit from associat-
ing with masculinities, but boys who behave or look like girls
(or, as in my example, have a Bgirl’s^ forename) are
contaminated by their association with lesser valued feminin-
ities. Similarly, in their account of patterns of change in an-
drogynous forenames (whereby increased deployment for
girls leads to decreased deployment for boys), Lieberson
et al. (2000, p. 1285) argue that the Badvantaged group [boys]
have more to lose in symbolic terms when their distinctive
features are merged with the less advantaged population,^ that
is, girls.
Correspondingly, there is also some evidence that girls with
typically boys’ forenames may gain some advantage from
their contradictory embodiment. Their (name-based) associa-
tion with higher-valued masculinities may mean, for example,
an increased likelihood of studying science and mathematics
(Bryner 2010; see also Coffey and McLaughlin 2009). These
findings suggest that a girl with a male-appropriate forename
may benefit from that contradictory embodiment, whereas a
boy with a female-typed forename is likely to be contaminated
by it. Moreover, Moss-Racusin et al.’s (2012) study suggests
that, for girls and women, having a forename that is recogniz-
ably typical for their sex category and gender can be disad-
vantageous in some circumstances. In a study of gender bias
among science faculty staff seeking to hire a laboratory man-
ager, Moss-Racusin and colleagues showed that, in otherwise
identical job applications, candidates with the sex-typed fore-
name of John were rated more highly than were candidates
with the sex-typed forename of Jennifer. So, in addition to
marking and displaying embodied sex category, I argue that
forenames are important in the doing of gender in terms of
maintaining a gender hierarchy in which masculinities are
routinely ranked over and above femininities.
Forenames are also important, I argue, in gendered embod-
ied practices of Bdoing difference^ (West and Fenstermaker
1995) with regard to race and ethnicity. Studies have shown
that forenaming practices are important in relation to what I
see as embodied processes of racial and ethnic honoring and
identification. For example, in a UK-based study, Edwards
and Caballero (2008) found that mixed-heritage parent cou-
ples wanted forenames that symbolized their children’s heri-
tage in relation to race, ethnicity, and/or faith, alongside sig-
naling their children’s (in my terms) embodied sex category
and gender. Using data that covered every child born in the
U.S. state of California since the 1960s and 1970s, Fryer and
Levitt’s (2003) analysis of forenames by gender and race doc-
uments some marked differences between choices of Blacks
and Whites. Some forenames (such as Shanice and Precious)
were found to be relatively popular among Blacks for girls,
but virtually unheard of forWhite girls; some boys’ forenames
(such as Connor and Jake) were found to be distinctively
White, with less than 2% of those so forenamed being Black.
Another U.S.-based study suggests that sex and gender
matter in terms of the ways embodied forename choices can
signal difference from and assimilation to majority cultures.
Sue and Telles (2007) examined the forenaming practices of
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Latino/a parents in relation to gender. Hispanic couples tended
to give their male children Spanish-appropriate forenames, but
more often gave their female children English-typed fore-
names. This patterning of forenames, sex, gender, and
Hispanic ethnicity was argued to be a reflection of boys being
regarded as the key carriers of ethnic tradition and as less in
need of protection against racial discrimination than were girls.
Similarly in the United Kingdom, the Office for National
Statistics’ annual report (2015) on the most popular baby
names is also suggestive of the ways that forenames for boys
may signal ethnic credentials or heritage more often than fore-
names for girls do. The latest data show that Muhammad was
the 12th most popular name given to baby boys in England
and Wales in 2015. Within Muslim families, the forename
Muhammad (or one of its spelling variations) is very dominant
because it is traditional to name baby boys after the prophet of
Islam in order to honor and respect him. As noted by Arnett
(2014), there is a lower variance in boys’ forenames among
UK’s Muslims than among other communities. In contrast,
data (Office for National Statistics 2015) do not indicate
equivalent practices among Muslim families in England and
Wales when forenaming girls.
Such evidence on race, ethnicity, and forenaming practices
is suggestive of the ways cultural processes of embodied iden-
tification relating both to the persistence of collective identity
and/or its transcendence (doing difference) through the fore-
names chosen for children are at the same time heavily reliant
on doing gender. Analysis of forenaming practices in relation
to race and ethnicity are also revealing of inequalities in a
gender order whereby boys may have a more enhanced status
as embodied carriers of ethnic heritage and bearers of ethnic
credentials compared to girls. Clearly, forenames can do im-
portant cultural work in relation to doing difference. The con-
cept of gendered embodied named identity helps us to recog-
nize that the important cultural work forenames do around
difference is (strongly and at the same time) also about doing
sex and gender.
Transgender People’s Forenaming
The laissez-faire character of the UK and U.S. legal frame-
works regulating personal names means, of course, that an
individual unhappy with their Bgender wrong^ or Bethnic
wrong^ forename can change it during their life course to
something they feel to be more right for themselves. For ex-
ample, the UK writer and broadcaster Clive James opted to
change from his given forename, Vivien, which is widely
regarded in English-speaking countries as a female-
appropriate name (McCrum 2013), whereas the U.S. sports-
man Cassius Clay opted to change his name to Muhammad
Ali in 1964 following his conversion to Islam (Peter 2016).
For transgender people, forenames are very obviously
intertwined with the embodiment of sex and gender and, like
these individuals’ visual appearance, are an important part of
their purposeful Bredoing^ of their sex category and gender
display. Well-known examples of transgender people chang-
ing their forenames in relation to their redoing of gender in-
clude Chelsea Elizabeth Manning, formerly Bradley
Manning, a U.S. soldier jailed in 2013 for leaking classified
documents (Gabbatt 2013). In changing their gender-wrong
birth forename to a sex-specific and/or gender-right one that is
appropriate to their chosen gender, forenames are an important
element of the efforts of some transgender people to pass in
everyday interactions.
Forenames also act as a fundamental component of evidence
of gender change in documents and other important cultural
artifacts for identification that support and confirm the new,
civil-legal identity of transgender people. For those transgender
people who identify as gender queer, a conscious choice of a
forename that is sex- and gender-neutral helps present and au-
thenticate their gender identity as one that does not adhere to
the binaries of female/male or feminine/masculine. In Connell’s
(2010) study, the interviewee Agape is argued to have chosen a
gender-neutral forename precisely because it underscored
Agape’s resistance to the gender binary and was an important
tool in Agape’s conscious redoing of gender.
In addition to Agape, Connell (2010) recounts the experi-
ences of another of her interviewees, Julie, a male-to-female
transgender person who worked in telephone-based customer
service. Julie found that customers often tried to make sense of
her masculine-sounding voice by Bmishearing^ her forename
and changing it to a Bguy’s name^ (p.41). Julie’s experiences
are revealing, I argue, in at least two respects. First, they sug-
gest the strength of cultural expectations that forenames cor-
rectly signal and match the embodiment of sex category (in
this case, a masculine-sounding voice) and, second, they are
illustrative of contradictory embodiment and of the strategies
individuals use (in this case, mishearing a forename and
substituting it with a sex- and gender-appropriate one) so as
to repair and sustain their common-sense knowledge about the
congruity of sex, gender, and forenames.
Julie’s telephone interactions with customers illuminate the
part played by forenames in the doing of gender: Forenames
are key to the social practices of placing others in gender
categories (Bdetermining gender^ as Westbrook and Schilt
2014, p. 32, term it) and to processes whereby individuals
are held to be accountable to sex category membership
(West and Zimmerman 2009). Forenames, then, have a key
role in presenting and authenticating individuals as belonging
to the assumed binary sex category of either female or male
and are important in the interpretation of the individual’s iden-
tity as authentically either feminine or masculine.
Consequently, transgender people and gender queers are par-
ticularly likely to have to deal with the consequences if their
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forename is perceived by others to contradict their embodi-
ment, that is, to Binaccurately^ or Bunclearly^ declare and
display their sex category and their gender.
The examples of the forenaming of children (including in
relation to doing ethnic difference) and forenaming by trans-
gender people have allowed me to show that sexed and gen-
dered forenaming deserves greater attention by gender
scholars and that the concept of gendered embodied named
identity has great utility in this respect. In relation to embodied
sex and gender, forenaming is a primary tool of sex categori-
zation and of gender display—acting to reinforce Bparticular
images of femininity and masculinity^ (Shilling 2012, p.108),
including in socially uneven and unequal ways. Next, I exam-
ine the ways surnaming practices are related to sex categori-
zation and contribute to the (re)doing of gender.
Marital and Children’s Surnaming
Asmy critical evaluation of the literature has shown, relatively
few sociological studies have focused primarily on forenames
and gender. In contrast, studies of heterosexual women’s sur-
name choices at marriage are more plentiful (e.g., Boxer and
Gritsenko 2005; Goldin and Shim 2004; Gooding and Kreider
2010; Hamilton et al. 2011; Lockwood et al. 2011;Mills 2003;
Robnett et al. 2016; Scheuble et al. 2012; Shafer 2017;
Twenge 1997; Valetas 2001; Wilson 2009). There are also
several studies of surname choices made for children
(Almack 2005; Davies 2011; Dempsey and Lindsay 2017;
Johnson and Scheuble 2002; Lockwood et al. 2011; Nugent
2010). This body of work primarily documents patterns of
change and determinants of choice or is undertaken from the
perspective of family and kinship practices. As such, it is less
concerned with how naming contributes to social practices of
sex and gender.
In this section of my article, I repurpose the body of work
on heterosexual women’s surname choices and on children’s
surnames to explore the roles surnames play in the doing and
redoing of gender. (As I explain in the following, there is a
paucity of evidence on surnaming practices of gay couples
and parents.) My focus is on surnaming practices in the
United Kingdom and the United States; detailing global and
cultural variations in surnaming practices is not possible here
(see Regional Organized Crime Information Center 2010).
What are the Balways already^ existing social contexts
(Shilling 2012, p. 4) shaping people’s surnaming practices in
the United Kingdom and United States? As I noted earlier, the
contemporary legislative frameworks regulating names in these
countries are permissive. This non-regulationmeans that, under
common law in both countries, individuals have the right to use
any surname as long as there is no fraudulent intent. Yet, in
practice, surnaming practices are heavily constrained by cultur-
al traditions (Emens 2007), especially, I argue here, those
relating to sex and gender. In the United Kingdom and
United States, surname practices are predominantly patronymic
(i.e., derived from a male ancestor) and patrilineal. In other
words, at marriage to someone whose sex category is male,
those whose sex category is female are routinely expected to
change from their birth surname to that of their husband.
Moreover, children are surnamed after their father.
In the United Kingdom, around 94% of women married to
a man change their surname to his. A small minority (4%) use
both their surname and their husband’s surname, and 1%
Bkeep^ their own surname (Valetas 2001). In the United
States, the picture is similar: 90% of women married to a
man change their surname to his surname, 5% use a hyphen-
ated surname, 3% use other alternatives, and 2% exclusively
use their birth surname (Gooding and Kreider 2010). In the
United States, patronymic naming cultures meant that, until as
recently as the 1970s, married women could not use their birth
surname to vote, to gain a passport or to hold a bank account.
Nowadays, either through statutes or case law, all U.S. states
allow for married women to retain use of their birth surname
(MacDougall 1985). It is clear that, as in the United Kingdom,
the vast majority of married women choose not to do so.
Like patronymic surnaming, the patrilineal surnaming of
children is an entrenched habit in U.S. and UK societies with
similar historical antecedents. Family surname choices favor-
ing the retention of men’s family surnames and the discarding
of women’s arose in these countries along with the develop-
ment of private property rights, modern legal systems, and the
expansion of the modern nation-state (Scott et al. 2002). There
are no available statistics on surname choices made for chil-
dren but in a U.S. survey, Johnson and Scheuble (2002) found
that less than 3% of children reported on had either their
mother’s surname only or a joint surname; the rest had their
father’s surname only. In the United States, state laws, either
by statute or common law, gave fathers the right to give chil-
dren their surname. During the 1970s, in the context of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
automatic right for the father’s surnames to prevail was re-
placed in many states by seemingly more gender-neutral judi-
cial decisions or statutes (Grossman 2003).
However, in practice, in the United States (as in the United
Kingdom) disputes between parents over the surnaming of a
child (post-divorce, for example) often continue to be resolved
in ways that are not gender-neutral. In particular, the mother’s
interest in passing on her surname has not been ranked as
highly as the father’s interest in passing on his (Grossman
2003). The perpetuation of family surname choices in which
men’s surnames are favored over women’s have been recog-
nized by both the United Nations (1979) and the Council of
Europe (2008) as a political issue of (in)equality. Yet, at the
time of writing, patrilineal and patronymic surnaming remain
ubiquitous cultural traditions in many countries of the world
(Regional Organized Crime Information Center 2010).
Sex Roles
In addition to being an indicator of inequality in the gender
order, what do patronymic and patrilineal surnaming practices
typical of the United Kingdom and the United States suggest
about bodies, identities, and the doing and redoing of gender?
Survey data from the United States suggests that married
women who take their husband’s surname are more likely to
beWhite, to have lower levels of educational qualifications, to
marry at a younger age, and to endorse more traditional
gender-role attitudes compared to women who go against
the norm by retaining their birth surname (Goldin and Shim
2004; Gooding and Kreider 2010; Johnson and Scheuble
1995, 1996b). Characteristics associated with non-
conventional marital surnaming by women include having
higher levels of educational qualifications, a higher age at
marriage, more liberal gender-role attitudes, and identifying
their race/ethnicity as other than White (Goldin and Shim
2004; Gooding and Kreider 2010; Johnson and Scheuble
1995, 1996b). Evidence suggests, then, an association among
surname choices, social class, race/ethnicity, and what might
loosely be termed orientations to gender.
Women’s choices about surnames at marriage can be rec-
ognized, I argue, as a core part of their embodied doing of
gender in adulthood. The great majority comply with patro-
nymic traditions, whereas a small minority, by retaining their
birth surname (in whole or in part), creatively re-do gender
through resisting the patriarchal norm. Yet, evidence on as-
pects of the process of choice, such as married women’s ra-
tionales for their surname choices, show that it is not just a
simple matter of habitual compliance with or creative resis-
tance to patriarchal naming practices. Instead, as I discuss
next, surname choices are embedded in multi-stranded and
complex strategies relating to embodied sex category and
the doing of gender.
A comparative U.S./Russian study by Boxer and Gritsenko
(2005) suggests that (heterosexual) women change their sur-
names at the naming crisis point of marriage for a variety of
reasons, such as to signal family connectedness (to show mar-
ital union/commitment and family solidarity and/or to mark
the beginning of a new stage of life) or as a pragmatic means
of avoiding confusion over disparate surnameswithin a family
unit (for the UK, see Thwaites 2013; Wilson 2009). These
findings support arguments by scholars that surname choices
are linked to family practices of the display of connectedness
and affinities, of BWe^ identities (Almack 2005; Davies 2011;
Elias 1991; Finch 2008). Of course, among heterosexual mar-
ried couples, such outcomes of surname changing could
equally be achieved by those in the embodied sex category
of men changing their surname, but this is not now, nor has it
ever been (in the UK and U.S. at least), a practice consistent
with the doing of hegemonic masculinity.
At marriage, rather than choosing either surname of the man
or (more rarely) the surname of the woman, relatively few het-
erosexual couples (800 in the UK in 2012) create an alternative
by meshing or blending their two surnames together to make an
entirely new one (Barnett 2012). There are no available figures
for how many men change their surname to that of their wife,
but, in contrast to women’s experiences, it remains a rare, non-
normative, and less than straightforward process (Emens 2007).
A newspaper report by Harris (2008) reveals how difficult it is in
reality for aman in theUnitedKingdom to change his surname to
his wife’s at marriage and how people respond with confusion,
disbelief, and disapproval if he does.
Instead of married men changing their surnames to that of
their wife (in order to display family connectedness and affin-
ities), then, it is instead routine and expected that these out-
comes are achieved through women changing their surnames.
That embodied sex category and gender are key to surnaming
practices is illustrated by my own experience (Pilcher 2016).
In 2007, my partner (a man) and I had a civil marriage cere-
mony (in the UK). At the point of signing the marriage regis-
ter, the Registrar reminded me not to sign it using my new
married name, but in my old surname. Having presumably
sex-categorized me on the basis of my bodily appearance as
the woman in our heterosexual partnership, the Registrar had
made the (erroneous) assumption that I would change my
surname as an automatic consequence of marrying.
Evidence from the United States shows that the minority of
women who, like me, Bkeep^ their birth surname after mar-
riage do so for reasons either of continuity of professional
identity, longevity of their birth surname, feminist ideology
or some combination of these (Gooding and Kreider 2010;
Johnson and Scheuble 1996a). These findings further support
an argument that the surname choices and practices of women
Bkeepers^ are important in their creative redoing of gender—
they go against the norm and keep their birth surname as part
of their identification as someone with equally legitimate
claims to surname retention as a man. (Other women may
engage in surname practices which, although non-
conventional among Whites, reflect their cultural heritage;
for example, Latino/a surnames traditionally contain both
the father’s and the mother’s paternal family names)
(Gooding and Kreider 2010; Regional Organized Crime
Information Centre 2010).
In the United Kingdom, the major group of official name
changers are women reverting back to their birth surnames
after the naming crisis point of divorce (Barkham 2010).
This pattern suggests to me that these women are creatively
resisting gender norms by (re)claiming their prior gendered
embodied named identity. The importance of patronymic
and patrilineal naming for doing and redoing gender is also
indicated, I argue, by the gender divide between women and
men on the issue of surnaming. In essence, evidence suggests
that men are more likely than women are to favor the retention
of conventional patronymic and patrilineal surnaming prac-
tices (in the U.S., Intons-Peterson and Crawford 1985,
Scheuble and Johnson 1993a, b, Shafer 2017; in the UK,
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Wilson 2009). In a UK study, Thwaites (2013) found that
some men became very upset if their female partner even
considered the idea of not changing her surname at marriage.
For me, such findings suggest a link, for some men at least,
between adherence to patronymic and patrilineal surnaming
practices and the validation of their masculinity.
Studies of the surnaming practices of gay male couples
suggest that surname changing is not practiced (Clarke et al.
2008; Patterson and Farr 2016; Suter and Oswald 2003),
whereas studies of lesbian couples with children reveal a var-
iance in surnaming practices (Dempsey and Lindsay 2017). In
most cases, though, the child is given the biological mother’s
surname only, or less often, a joint surname to include that of
the social mother (Almack 2005; Gartrell et al. 1999). Overall,
though, the limited empirical evidence on gay couples and
parents places restrictions on knowledge and understanding
of the ways that sexuality may intersect with sex and gender
in family and kinship naming practices.
Data from the United Kingdom and the United States on
surname practices at marriage and divorce, the surnaming of
children, and the characteristics of women making surname
choices, along with evidence on a gender divide in support for
conventional surnaming practices which privilege men’s sur-
names over women’s, suggest that patronymic and patrilineal
surnaming practices are strongly related to (sex categorized)
bodies and the doing of gender. As I have shown, surnames,
like forenames, are key to the ways gender differences are
routinely accomplished through the everyday, ongoing em-
bodied social interactions that sustain identities. In addition
to its doing, surnames can also play a part in the re-doing of
gender. Moreover, it is clear that surnaming practices have
outcomes which are socially uneven and unequal. As with
forenames, the concept of gendered embodied named identi-
ties enhances our understanding of these processes via its fo-
cus on the relationship among surnames, bodies, and gender.
Names, Gender Identities, Difference,
and Inequalities
From an everyday, common-sense perspective, personal
names are merely labels (naming words or proper nouns in
grammatical terms) that are applied to individuals and which
serve to identify them as such. In my article, I have re-
purposed evidence to overcome this functional fixedness
about the purpose of names by showing that forenames and
surnames are, in addition, doing or action words in relation to
sex and to gender. Personal names are key both to the decisive
accomplishment of the categorization of sex at birth and, sub-
sequently, in relation to the ongoing management of gender
conduct appropriate to sex category. In this final section, I
draw together my ideas about the important, specific cultural
work that personal names do in relation to embodied sex
category and to gender identities, difference, and inequalities,
by revisiting three key questions that I identified in my intro-
duction. I summarize the ways our understandings of sexed
and gendered naming practices are now enhanced in relation
to these questions, including how forenames and surnames are
used as multi-faceted tools in the doing of sex and gender.
A key question I set out to address in the present article was
how, in relation to sex and gender, embodied individuals re-
spond at critical points of naming in the life course. These
critical/crisis points (Shilling 2008) represent, at least in theo-
ry, opportunities for individuals to use personal names either
in the reproduction of the normative (and patriarchal) gender
order, or in its disruption. At the crisis point of giving a fore-
name to a newborn child, evidence presented in my article
shows that most people respond normatively. In other words,
at birth, a child is typically given a forename which is norma-
tively appropriate for the sex categorization attributed to their
body. The choice of androgynous or sex/gender-neutral fore-
names, which might serve to disrupt the gender order, remain
a rarity (Herbert and Aylene 2014; Lieberson et al. 2000).
Evidence discussed earlier showed that gendered fore-
names are important in the process of doing difference in the
context of the power structures of race and ethnicity (Edwards
and Caballero 2008; Fryer and Levitt 2003; Sue and Telles
2007). However, such (otherwise creative) naming practices
of ethnic difference tend not to disrupt the normative gender
order, typically (re)producing binary sex categorizations and,
in some instances, the valuing of male/masculinities over fe-
male/femininities. For transgender people, choosing a new
forename is a critical point in passing in their chosen gender.
However, evidence considered here (Connell 2010; Gabbatt
2013; Kessler and McKenna 1978; see also, Schilt 2006) sug-
gests that (non-gender neutral) forename choices made by
transgender people can contribute to the reproduction of nor-
mative naming practices which habitually link forenames to
one or the other of the binary sex categories (female/male) and
to the associated display of gender.
Forenames can be conceptualized, then, as routinized, nor-
mative tools of categorization, used by individuals in the deter-
mination, confirmation, and display of sex category—initially
at birth, subsequently throughout the life course, and, for trans-
gender people, at a key point in their redoing of their gender. In
being heavily embedded in the categorization of sex and the
associated display of gender, forenames can also be recognized
as Btools of negation^ (to repurpose Connell’s 1987, p. 79–80,
concept). In other words, the widespread use of sex and gen-
dered forenames in place of androgynous forenames operates
to negate (or downplay) similarities between embodied individ-
uals and accentuate their differences, including of genitalia.
Forenaming practices at key naming crisis points in a per-
son’s life course can also be conceived of as tools of compli-
ance with the doing of sex and gender as binaries. Such prac-
tices might be unconsciously (habitually) compliant or be a
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pragmatic choice, so as to avoid the problems caused by con-
tradictory embodiment, where forenames are perceived as a-
typical for a person’s sex category. On the other hand, fore-
names which are consciously chosen and creatively used by
individuals, either because of their gender neutrality or precise-
ly because of their element of contradictory embodiment in
relation to sex categorization, can be recognized as tools of
resistance to the doing of sex and gender as binaries, as well
as a means of disrupting the normative gender order. For those
transgender people who identify as gender queer, a creative
choice of a forename that is sex- and gender-neutral helps pres-
ent and authenticate their gender identity as one that does not
adhere to the binaries of female/male or feminine/masculine (as
shown by the interviewee Agape in Connell’s 2010, study).
Like forenames, surnames operate differently according to
embodied sex category and to gender. Marriage and/or the
surnaming of children are the key choice crises points at play
here, offering individuals an opportunity either to go-with-the-
flow of normative surnaming practices in relation to sex and
gender or to disrupt them. As with forenames, the evidence
shows that most people’s choices are normative, and so the
(patriarchal) gender order is (re)produced: patrilineal and pat-
ronymic surnaming practices are prevalent in both the United
Kingdom and the United States (Gooding and Kreider 2010;
Johnson and Scheuble 2002; Valetas 2001). Patronymic and
patrilineal family surnaming operate, then, as routinely de-
ployed tools which display that women and children belong
to men in a hierarchical gender order. A man’s (embodied)
sex categorization invariably means that there are no cultural
expectations whatsoever that he should, at marriage to a wom-
an, change his surname to hers; precisely the opposite is true for
those whose bodies have been categorized as female. Rejection
of such surnaming practices might be interpreted negatively as
discrediting an individual’s femininity/masculinity (Harris
2008; Robnett et al. 2016), or, more positively, as a redoing
of gender along more equalitarian lines (Mills 2003; Thwaites
2013; Wilson 2009). Surnaming is, then, related to sex catego-
rization, and it is a tool for the display of gender. Like
forenaming, surnaming practices are subject to interpretation
and evaluation, and they are part of the process whereby gender
is determined, attributed, and authenticated in ongoing interac-
tion through practices of embodied named identity.
The majority of women who change their surname at mar-
riage to a man, and/or surname their children after their father,
can be recognized as practicing compliance with a gender
order which gives greater value to masculinities than to fem-
ininities. Such practices might be unconsciously (habitually)
compliant, or be a pragmatic choice so as to avoid problems
that may arise from having an array of surnames within a
family unit. The small minority of women (and, even more
rarely, men) who, in heterosexual partnerships and/or mar-
riages, or at the point of divorce, make creative, non-
normative surname choices for themselves and/or their
children can be conceived of as deploying surnames as tools
of resistance to the gender order. As I noted earlier, the reasons
(heterosexual) women give for changing/not changing sur-
names at marriage and/or for the surnaming of their children
are multi-stranded and complex (Boxer and Gritsenko 2005),
and undoubtedly they are bound up with differential positions
of privilege and disadvantage, not least of which relate to
social class and education (Goldin and Shim 2004; Gooding
and Kreider 2010; Johnson and Scheuble 1995, 1996b).
Nonetheless, these practices of gendered embodied named
identity are strongly revealing of the centrality of marital and
family surnaming as tools related to sex categorization and
used in the doing and redoing of gender.
The second of the key questions I identified in the introduc-
tion is concerned with how individuals experience and manage
crises caused by the breaching of normative expectations about
the coincidence of names with sexed/gendered bodies.
Evidence on this issue is more limited. In the case of forenames,
it would seem that normative expectations about the coinci-
dence of bodies, sex category, gender, and forenames are so
strong, that those perceived by others to have inauthentic or
wrong forenames may find that their gender conduct is held
to account as a consequence (as shown by the experiences of
Julie, the male-to-female transperson in Connell’s 2010, study).
Cultural knowledge of the strong association between fore-
names, sex, and gender, then, leads people to use forenames
as tools in the attribution and authentication of sex and gender
(both for themselves and for others) in responsive and creative
ways. Forenames that are gender-wrong can be retained, de-
spite any perceived contradictory embodiment (as in the song,
BA Boy Named Sue^; Absolute Lyrics 2017). Nonetheless,
such forenames are likely to cause initial and ongoing problems
(Figlio 2007) as others deploy strategies to repair their
common-sense knowledge about forenames, sex, and gender
in the attempt to reconcile the dissonance between the embod-
ied individual they experience and that person’s forename.
The cultural expectations in the United Kingdom and the
United States around the links among sex category, marital
surnaming, and the surnaming of children mean that assump-
tions are routinely made by others about women’s and chil-
dren’s surnames being the same as that of the family’s man.
When these normative expectations are breached (when wom-
en retain their birth surname at marriage, when men change
their surnames at marriage, or in disputes over children’s sur-
names post-divorce) responses may include confusion and
disapproval and/or a fallback to normative understandings
(Grossman 2003; Harris 2008; Robnett et al. 2016). Such
normative understandings result in the continued deployment
of patriarchal and patrilineal surnaming practices in defiance
of the preferences of the individual whose surname it is
(Davies 2011; Pilcher 2016; Wilson 2009).
The third of my key questions asked how personal naming
practices and their outcomes are socially uneven and unequal.
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Evidence reviewed in my article shows that sex- and gender-
categorized forenames remain strongly prevalent over
gender-neutral ones for newborns, and they are often impor-
tant markers for transgender people in helping to secure their
chosen gender identification. These are forenaming practices
that serve to emphasize normative understandings of the
importance of sex and gendered binary differences, rather
than commonalities, between embodied humans. Evidence
discussed earlier suggests that even when gender-neutral
forenames (given to both boys and girls) are in circulation,
their deployment for boys gradually decreases (Lieberson
et al. 2000); the association (albeit only partial) with
lesser-valued femininity is a source of contamination for
(originally) androgynous forenames. Likewise, boys with
forenames more typically given to girls have been shown
to be more disadvantaged than vice versa (Bryner 2010;
Figlio 2007), whereas even for girls, female-typed fore-
names may signal weaker competencies than male-typed
forenames in some circumstances (Moss-Racusin et al.
2012). Forenames can be chosen to display ethnic identifi-
cation and honor ethnic heritage (Edwards and Caballero
2008; Fryer and Levitt 2003), but it seems that such creative
choices may at the same time (re)produce sex categorization,
gender display, and masculine privilege (Fryer and Levitt
2003; Sue and Telles 2007). In summary, far from being
even and equal, forename practices and their consequences
are heavily sex- and gender-typed and provide evidence of
the continued valuing of masculinities over femininities.
In the case of surnames, identifications based on embodied
sex category continue to be the primary determinants of mar-
ital surnaming and children’s surnaming, at least among het-
erosexual couples in the UK and the U.S. (Gooding and
Kreider 2010; Johnson and Scheuble 2002; Valetas 2001).
The normative choices made by heterosexual women at mar-
riage and about surnames for children have been shown to be
multi-stranded and complex (Boxer and Gritsenko 2005;
Davies 2011; Nugent 2010), not least in terms of the interplay
of privilege and disadvantage in relation to social class, edu-
cation and ethnicity (Goldin and Shim 2004; Gooding and
Kreider 2010; Johnson and Scheuble 1995, 1996b). In sum-
mary, well-educated, professional, and other thanWhite wom-
en are among those most likely to make the minority choice of
retaining their birth surname at marriage. Men rarely change
their surname at marriage to a woman. I have argued else-
where that (White, heterosexual) men have the strongest, most
consistent, embodied named identities over their life courses:
their (otherwise) privileged social position means they are the
least culturally enabled to make (official) changes to their
names (Pilcher 2016). Meanwhile, men remain more support-
ive than women of the continuation of normative surnaming
practices at marriage and for children which privilege men’s
surnames (Scheuble and Johnson 1993a, b; Shafer 2017;
Thwaites 2013; Wilson 2009). In summary, intersectional
differences in privilege and power (Hill Collins and Bilge
2016) may impact upon people’s awareness of surnaming op-
tions at marriage and for children, and their ability to act upon
those options, as well as their support for the continuance of
patriarchal and patrilineal practices. Once again, personal
naming practices and their outcomes are shown to be socially
uneven and unequal.
Areas for Future Research
The limited attention thus far paid to the topic means that there
is plentiful scope for further sociological research to unpick
the complexities of forename and surnames choices and uses
in relation to sex and gender. The practices of transgender
people offer a particularly rich opportunity for exploring the
part forenames play in constituting and displaying gender
identifications. The family surnaming practices of gay and
queer civil-partnered or married couples may offer special
insight into how Bdoing we^ through surnames is gendered
in complex ways beyond that suggested by evidence on the
practices of heterosexual couples. It would be illuminating,
too, to gain a greater understanding of the associations that
heterosexual men make among surnames, spousal and paren-
tal relationships, and masculine identities.
Broader questions to be answered through future empirical
research might include how individuals understand the fore-
names (and surnames) they have been given in terms of the
gendered (and racial/ethnic) meanings they encode.
Meanwhile, it is still true to say that (in the UK and the U.S.
at least) the fact that names are heavily sexed and gendered is
likely regarded as a relatively minor feature of contemporary
social life—as a trivial concern rather than as a big, pressing
social and political issue. Yet, as I have demonstrated in my
article, these are not benign or neutral cultural practices. The
concept of gendered embodied named identity has great utility
in showing how naming practices are, in fact, core to the pro-
duction and reproduction of binary sex categories and to gen-
dered hierarchies and inequalities, and they are related in im-
portant ways to doing difference. Far from being small and
insignificant, personal names are powerful cultural tools and
deserve greater attention than they have to date, not least of
all by gender scholars.
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